Dreaming as a Critical Discourse of National Belonging: China Dream, American Dream, and World Dream
The rise of China has complicated the way we think about global politics. In 2015, Beijing challenged the Western-led world order first diplomatically through institution-building, and then militarily through island-building: Beijing launched the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, a new multilateral institution that challenges the World Bank, and then built military bases on top of coral reefs in the South China Sea to challenge neighboring countries and the US (French 2015; Callahan 2016) .
It is easy to understand institution-building and island-building in terms of materialist international relations theories: liberal institutionalism and offensive realism (Ikenberry 2012; Mearsheimer 2014) . What is often missing from discussions of the rise of China is the ideational challenge posed by Beijing: how does the rise of nationalism, and identity politics more broadly, shape domestic and international politics in China? Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a shift from grand ideologies that universally apply to 'humanity'-such as communism-to ideas and identities that are more local, national, and regional.
Indeed, often we don't talk about 'liberal democracy' as an ideology available to all, but analyze comparative and international politics in terms 'Western democracy' that may not apply to other regions. Huntington's (1996) vision of world politics as a 'clash of civilizations' is an example of this trend, where identity takes shape in relation to 'difference'. Following the critique of cosmopolitan universals seen in the epigraph of Knott's 'Introduction' to this section on 'Nationalism and Belonging'-'But of course not everyone belongs' (Spiro 2007: 3)-identity politics here defines the self against the Other in order to narrate the nation (see Connolly 1991: 64; Bhabha 1990 ). The rise of nationalism in China-against some negative idealization of the West/Americahas been an important part of this oppositional trajectory of national belonging.
Hence most analyses frame the rise of China in terms of a challenge to the West, where Beijing replaces Washington as the capital of the world, and China's harmonious civilizational values replace Western democratic values (Jacques 2009; Kang 2007; Katzenstein 2012; Rozman 2013 ). This article takes a different track to compare parallel nationalist discourses in China and the United States:
the China Dream and the American Dream. Following the 'Nationalism & Belonging' focus of ASEN's 2014 annual conference, this paper will examine how belonging in China and the US involves a nostalgic longing for the past as a model for the future. Rather than take identity and membership for granted as fixed or stable entities, the article examines how national belonging is the product of very active and ongoing political and moral debates among political leaders, popular culture, and public intellectuals. It will show how the national belonging evoked in these two national dreams can lead to the socialization of ideals, and thus to a belonging that is constrained by the nation. It also highlights how national dreams can invoke belonging beyond domestic space: both the China Dream and the American Dream have active constituencies far beyond their national territories-and not just among expatriate or diaspora communities.
Rather than taking the 'nation' for granted as an essential identity or an actor in a rational calculus, it is helpful to see the nation as a set of unstable social relations that take on coherence through cultural governance (Shapiro 2004) . Cultural governance here looks to Foucault's (1991) understanding of power as a productive force that is generated by social relationships, rather than as a set of juridical practices that restrict action. Shapiro (2004:34) argues that while for the early-modern state, sovereignty relied on 'military and fiscal initiatives', by the nineteenth century these 'coercive and economic aspects of control have been supplemented by a progressively intense cultural governance … aimed at making territorial and national/cultural boundaries coextensive. ' But Shapiro (2004:49) does not simply chart out the productive power of state-led cultural governance; his critical approach also shows how resistance to restrictive national identity can emerge through other modalities of expression-film, theater, television, novels and other counter-nationalist or alternative-nationalist narratives-that 'challenge the state's coherence-producing writing performances.'
Rather than enter into the grand debate about whether nationalism precedes nations (or not) (see Gellner 1982 , Smith 1986a , Armstrong 1982 , I would like to explore the contingencies of national belonging by employing a set of concepts, rather than arguing in terms of a set of ideologies. Here I follow Anderson (1991: 5) , who suggests that it would 'make things easier if one treated
[nationalism] as if it belonged with "kinship" and "religion," rather than with "liberalism" or "fascism".' But rather than looking to nationalism studies' established list of concepts-language, kinship, religion, and geography, for example (see Renan 1990 )-I am interested to see how more modest concepts-the 'American Jeremiad' and 'patriotic worrying' [youhuan yishi]-can help explain national belonging as a coherence-producing performance in the US and China (more below). This follows from interesting work done on the power of affect and emotion on national identity construction, especially the role of nostalgia in national belonging (see Muro 2005; Armstrong 1982; Smith 2015; Murphy 2009 ).
By framing analysis in terms of a suspicion of grand narratives (i.e. nationalism as ideology), self/Other relations, and the contingent dynamic of cultural governance/resistance, this study employs a poststructuralist approach to the normative politics of national belonging. Rather than measuring 'nationalism' through public opinion survey research, it seeks to interpret identity politics through discourse analysis. It focuses on texts by political leaders not because they are 'true', but because they are influential. While as commander-inchief the US president wields considerable hard power, presidential discourse is explored in this article because of the soft power value of the White House as a 'bully pulpit'. The discursive power of the Chinese president is even stronger (see Brady 2008) . Likewise, the article looks to popular culture-the China Idol singing contest, for example-not because it reflects true identity or opinion, but because it is wildly popular in terms of viewership and commentary. Chinese people are buying into the China Dream by consuming nationalism in particular ways (see Callahan 2010) . Public intellectuals hence are interesting because they mediate between the official power of the state (i.e. presidential speeches) and the informal power of popular culture (i.e. television shows): in China, public intellectuals are important because they are close advisors to the party-state, while at the same time drumming up support for their ideas in online media and television talk shows (see Callahan 2013) . Hence, this article chooses texts not according to their content (i.e. interesting ideas), but according to their popularity in official and popular arenas. In this way, what we might otherwise dismiss as 'propaganda', now becomes meaningful information that provides a sense of the debates that animate the normative politics of national belonging in China (Pieke 2009; Swaine 2012:1-2) . This article thus shifts from an empiricist explanation that relies on a truthful representation of the facts, to a poststructuralist understanding that relies on persuasive interpretation (Shapiro 2013, pp. 29-30; Bryman 2012, pp. 26-32) . Indeed, this interpretive approach is how Chinese scholars engage with official discourse: they look for patterns in order to add meaning to vague official declarations (see Xu and Du 2015) .
Lastly, it might seem odd that I am employing methods developed to study Chinese discourse, which is often very vague, repetitious, and unwieldy, to analyze the American Dream as well. Since the discourse of 'exceptionalism'
animates normative debates about national belonging in both China and the US (more below), it is common for Americanists and Sinologists to analyze their topics in isolation. This article deliberately juxtaposes two well-analyzed topicsnationalism in authoritarian China and democratic America-to trace out connections, similarities, and differences. But rather than starting out from the Such national expressions of dreams characteristically posit an essential national identity, which is often dismissed as propaganda: the 'myth' of the American Dream (Hodgson 2009; Noble 2007; Owen 2002) . Others look to the dark side of American history-slavery and militarism-to tell us that the American experience is better described as a nightmare (Bacevich 2009; Hodgson 2009; Murphy 2009: 136; Nobel 2007 (Hodgson 2009 ; also see Bercovitch 2012: 9-10).
But such efforts to 'disprove' the American Dream miss the point. A myth is not simply a falsehood; as Aristotle told us, a myth is 'made up of things to wonder at ' (cited in Madsen 1995: 227) . The American Dream and the China Dream thus are not facts to be proven or disproven, but moral narratives that express a nation's aspirations and anxieties in poly-vocal conversations about the good life, civilization, and progress (Madsen 1995: 209-10; Murphy 2009:135) . Rather than denouncing or mocking such dreams, as do many scholars and public intellectuals, we should take them seriously as a way of thinking about how national belonging takes shape through debates about values. Attention to such dreams can help us see how nations are an ongoing coherence-producing performance that both includes and excludes various groups (see Butler 1993 ).
As suggested above, the issues here are both theoretical and empirical.
They are empirical in the sense that we need to conduct a thick description of the China Dream (because it is quite recent), and of the American Dream (because it is so enduring). Rather than affirming essentialist singular national identities, I will argue that dream discourse grows out of vigorous normative debates about national belonging. These debates highlight the tension between freedom and equality in the US, and between the individual and the collective in China. More generally, they highlight the tension between longing for the true nation, and belonging in the actual nation. As we will see, such dreams erupt not merely in Dream has now become a mission to the world (Bercovitch 2012; 1978; Murphy 2009:126) .
In China, 'patriotic worrying' [youhuan yishi] presents a similar backwardlooking discourse. This 'patriotic worrying' gives intellectuals the moral obligation to frame problems and solutions in terms of China's national and civilizational perfection. Intellectuals feel that it is their job to ponder the fate of the nation, and to find the correct formula to solve China's problems. Once the correct formula is discovered, then China will be rejuvenated and take its rightful place at the center of the world (Davies 2007; Bøckman 1998) . The article's conclusion thus will consider the limits of these two critical interventions: rather than Chinese and American Dreams looking forward to a pluralistic future, both the American Jeremiad and Chinese 'patriotic worrying' aim to get their nations back on the straight-and-narrow path that leads to national perfection. To put it another way, it will consider how 'critical' does not necessarily mean progressive. As we will see, values-talk in both China and the US is dominated by broadly conservative ideals: the family, the collective, and order. The goal of the national dream is national perfection rather than the universal emancipation of humanity. This, once again, shows how the normative politics of national belonging differs from cosmopolitan evocations of solidarity that prescribe universal belonging.
The China Dream
On 29 Xi's invocation of the China Dream thus is responding to a 'crisis' in state power that runs parallel to the values crisis in civil society: a crisis of political legitimacy in the rapidly changing social situation that is the result of China's rapidly growing economy. Although from the outside China may look confident, internally many of its leaders are uneasy; as it fulfills its grand aspirations, China simultaneously encounters nagging political, social, and economic uncertainties.
According to both officials and public intellectuals, China is in an 'era of strategic opportunity'. The stakes are high-if Beijing misses this great opportunity to fulfill the China Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, then many feel that the PRC risks total failure: 'If China in the twenty-first century cannot become world number one, cannot become the top power, then inevitably it will become a straggler that is cast aside' (Liu 2010: 9).
Xi thus promotes the China Dream as a 'composite ideology' to address a wide array of opportunities and risks (Smith 1986b:83ff) . It is full of contradictions, but that is not necessarily a weakness. As a composite ideology, the China Dream it is able to encompass both individual dreams of happiness Dream is dead. But I'm gonna make it bigger and better and stronger than ever before. We are going to make America great again' (cited in Vorhees 2016).
Although it characteristically informs conservative movements, the American Dream can support progressive politics: Richard Rorty (1998:101) appealed to the power of dreams for progressive social change when he wrote:
You have to describe the country in terms of what you passionately want it to become, as well as what you know it to be now. You have to be loyal to a dream country rather than to the one to which you wake up every morning. Unless such loyalty exists, the ideal has no chance of becoming actual.
According to the liberal narrative of expanding freedom and equality, the American Dream informed the civil rights struggles of the 1960s and 1970s that led to greater rights and freedoms regardless of race, class, gender and sexuality (Murphy 2009:132ff) . The Supreme Court's 2015 decision to celebrate same-sex marriage thus is seen by such liberal reformers as the latest victory in this ongoing struggle to achieve the American Dream.
Like Chinese intellectuals, American writers worry that their treasured values are at risk. While the Chinese deal with this existential threat through 'patriotic worrying', Americans do it through 'jeremiads', the bitter political sermons that criticize the moral corruption of society and lament the nation's imminent decline:
We Americans, the jeremiad proclaims, have failed to live up to our founding principles, betrayed our sacred covenant as history's (or God's) chosen nation, and must rededicate ourselves to our ideals, reclaim our founding promise (Stephenson 2010) . Obama (2006: 233) argues that to understand the future we have to view the US through a 'split screen' in order 'to maintain in our sights the kind of America that we want while looking squarely at America as it is, to acknowledge the sins of our past and the challenges of the present without becoming trapped in cynicism or despair'.
The American Dream has always been part of a global discourse. It was a reaction to what are called the 'Old World' values of European class society (Bercovitch 2012: 6; Murphy 2009; Rorty 1998: 24) . The United States here is figured as the world's first new nation, a new utopia: John Winthrop's (1630) sermon 'A Model of Christian Charity', which was invoked in key speeches of both John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan, preached that America is 'a city upon a hill' that would be judged not just by God, but also by the world because 'the eyes of all people are upon us.' Abraham Lincoln's American dream is not just for Americans, because it gives 'liberty not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men, and that all should have an equal chance.' Lincoln thus concludes that America is 'the last, best hope of earth' (cited in Cullen 2003, 94, 96) . James Truslow Adams agrees:
'The American dream of a better, richer, and happier life for all our citizens of every rank which is the greatest contribution we have as yet made to the thought and welfare of the world' (Adams 1931: viii) While both concepts describe how public intellectuals can and do join national debates, it is important to note that both concepts have been criticized for limiting the possibility of critical discourse. Sacvan Bercovitch (1978 Bercovitch ( , 2012 National dreams thus are exemplary sites of the normative politics of national belonging. As this article has shown, belonging to the nation, in both China and the US, involves a nostalgic longing for the past as a model for the future. But it also seeks to avoid the meta-Jeremiad that apocalyptically denounces Americanism (and Chinese civilization) as dead-end discourses.
Indeed, we need to take them seriously because both dreams can be used as discursive tools to critically evaluate the nation and the world. By using a poststructural approach to highlight the contingent nature of the normative politics of national belonging, the article follows Knott's 'Introduction' to broaden our understanding of nationalism beyond issues of (often fixed notions of) of identity and membership. It also follows the 'Introduction' to explore how self/Other performances of national dreams actually evoke normative discourse beyond the nation, which is still neither universalistic nor cosmopolitan: both national dreams have gone global. The China Dream and the American Dream thus are, at the same time, 1) familiar expressions of nationalism and national belonging, and 2) ongoing self/Other coherence-producing performances that help us to question received notions of nationalism and national belonging.
